The High Court of Australia's decision in Mabo v. Queensland (No.2
and findings of fact in Southern Rhodesia did not form a part of the Australian common law. In this article, I suggest that the first proposition rendered a fragmentary and ambiguous set of judicial statements about the effect of white settlement on aboriginal tenure more coherent than they actually were; and that the second proposition represented an attempt to consign the racist doctrine of English colonial law to the past.
I also distinguish Brennan J's approach to legal history from that adopted by the sole dissenting judge, Dawson J. By comparing the two approaches, which roughly correspond with the two main camps in Australia's "history wars" (Hunter 1996) , it becomes possible to see the ways in which the fault lines in historical visions correspond with disagreement about contemporary political values.
I should make it clear from the outset that it is not my intention to suggest that Mabo is an example of bad judicial decision-making or shoddy legal history.
3 I am conscious that my argument in this article could be read as making an argument similar to that of Michael Connor (2005 Connor ( , 2003 , who castigated both the High Court's decision in Mabo and historian Henry Reynolds for introducing the legal fiction of terra nullius, only to knock it down. I disagree with Connor on several points. First, I believe as a matter of both principle and pragmatism that the courts have an important role to play in reconciliation and that judges not only have the power, but also the duty, to ensure that the common law moves away from racist and sexist doctrine. Fitzmaurice (2006) suggests that while the use of the term terra nullius was anachronistic, it served as a shorthand for the arguments used to justify dispossession. It does appear that the term "terra nullius" was unknown to colonial Australia, and Reynolds seems to have let himself down in his work on the phrase's supposed influence on the pattern of white settlement in Australia. Notwithstanding the unquestionable significance of this assertion for Reynolds' scholarship, my second point of disagreement with Connor 4 relates to the consequences of that revelation for Mabo. Connor says that: "By the time of Mabo in 1992, terra nullius was the only explanation for the British settlement of Australia. … [Reynold's work on terra nullius] underpinned the Mabo judges' decisionmaking." (Connor, 2003.) In fact, as I explain here, Brennan J's decision in Mabo was predicated on the reasoning that, when Australia became part of the Crown's dominion, the law of England (so far as applicable to the conditions of the colony) became the law of Australia. This law included the principle that, upon sovereignty, the Crown acquired the absolute ownership of waste lands in Australia. In Southern Rhodesia, the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council interpreted "waste lands" to include land occupied by people who had no recognizable conception of private property rights. Brennan J's somewhat perplexing discussion of terra nullius does not displace his reasoning that the common law contained a thread of precedent to the effect that the waste lands of Australia became Crown land at the time of settlement. Nor does it obviate Brennan J's conclusion that "waste lands" were interpreted by colonial courts to include land that was formerly occupied and used by Australian aborigines. This reasoning forms the focus of my discussion in this article.
Unlike Connor, I am tremendously glad that, at least for a short time, a majority of the High Court of Australia had the courage and imagination to propagate a vision of an Australian society that would acknowledge and seek partly to remedy the wrongs of the past. Historical narratives are always and necessarily selective (Wishart, 1997 The Mabo decision is a landmark in the High Court's brief departure from the conservative approach to legal decision-making that is most characteristic of Australia's highest court. Brennan J's decision provides an exemplar for legal positivism in terms of its logical structure and careful analysis of colonial common law precedent. 4 Brennan J was careful to delineate the boundaries of the existing common law, and to identify when he chose to extend those boundaries. The leading judgment identified a moral imperative to depart from English precedent in some respects:
It must be acknowledged that, to state the common law in this way involves the overruling of cases which have held the contrary. To maintain the authority of those cases would destroy the equality of all Australian citizens before the law. The common law of this country would perpetuate injustice if it were … to persist in characterizing the indigenous inhabitants of the Australian colonies as people too low in the scale of social organization to be acknowledged as possessing rights and interests in land. Moreover, to reject the theory that the Crown acquired absolute beneficial ownership of land is to bring the law into conformity with Australian history. (Mabo per Brennan J at 57 -58. See also 29 -30.) This passage represents a refreshingly honest moment in the development of Australian common law: a decision in which, for once, the judges acknowledged that their role is about more than how best to fit this case with the last. Brennan J's Mabo judgment was 6 also about myth-making in its grandest sense: fashioning a story of the past with which to juxtapose (indeed, to construct) a present and future that was more becoming to a tolerant and multicultural society. The propositions made by Brennan J about legal history permitted the court to characterise itself as making a break with the racist assumptions and practices of another time, another place. Locating racism in the past, and elsewhere, also deflected attention away from the ways in which the Mabo decision perpetuated a racialised order within Australian society. These are the currents that I wish to trace by unpacking Brennan J's Mabo judgment.
INDIGENOUS TENURE IN PRE-MABO AUSTRALIAN COMMON LAW
[T]he theory which underpins the application of English law to the Colony of New South
Wales is that English settlers brought with them the law of England and that, as the indigenous inhabitants were regarded as barbarous or unsettled and without a settled law, the law of England including the common law became the law of the Colony (so far as it was locally applicable) [.] (Mabo per Brennan J. at 38.)
In his classic text on English colonial law, Roberts-Wray (1966: 636) suggested that certain general principles governed land tenure after colonisation by whatever means (conquest, cession or settlement). In any colony, ultimate title vested in the Crown.
However, the Crown was taken to recognise and protect pre-existing private rights of property, and these rights were therefore considered unimpaired unless the occupiers of land agreed to the extinguishment of rights or rights were extinguished by clear legislative intention. As well as being a general statement of the common law, this position reflected that of Blackstone, who applauded the practice of settling colonies provided that:
it was confined to the stocking and cultivation of desert uninhabited countries … But how far the seising on countries already peopled, and driving out or massacring the innocent and defenceless natives, merely because they differed from their invaders in language, in is an established system of law, and that of a Colony which consisted of a tract of territory practically unoccupied, without settled inhabitants at the time when it was peacefully annexed … New South Wales belongs to the latter class. (At 291; see Hocking, 1993.) In this judgment, the Privy Council does not quite go so far as to deny that the Colony of New South Wales was inhabited in 1788 when the first fleet arrived in Sydney Harbour.
However, it is able to ignore the pre-existing Aboriginal relationships with the land.
Classifying the territory as "practically unoccupied" asserts in this context both that the land was largely unlived in and that the land was, for practical purposes, unutilised by its ed, 1911: 205.) It is arguably implicit in Isaacs J's judgment in Williams that lands occupied by
Aborigines were "waste lands" to which no subject could show title (see also Williams ( Over time, as the white frontier advanced and the aboriginal population was increasingly successfully contained, it almost became possible to forget that indigenous Australians had once lived, worked on and maintained a relationship with the lands that now hosted newer Australians' cities and roads and farms. We know that the revolution was not as bloodless or as peaceful as has from time to time been suggested; but it was sufficiently far removed, in time and space, from the majority of the white twentieth century Australian population to be ignored. The task of telling the story of dispossession to a white Australian audience is a difficult one in light of this distance, and it becomes more difficult once one takes into account the conservative historians' suspicion of oral history and other non-traditional historical sources.
6 And yet, in Mabo, the High Court of The words 'desert and uncultivated' are Blackstone's own; they have always been taken to include territory in which live uncivilized inhabitants in a primitive state of society.
[Emphasis added.] (At 201.)
Blackburn J found that the relevant aboriginal communities evinced "a subtle and elaborate system … If ever a system could be called 'a government of laws, and not of men', it is that shown in the evidence before me." (At 267.) However, he regarded himself as being bound by Cooper v. Stuart and other Privy Council authority to hold as a matter of law that New South Wales was a settled colony, and that communally held aboriginal land was "desert and uncultivated" territory.
If one confines one's consideration of the history of land tenure to judicial doctrine regarding Australia, or even to that which is concerned with settled colonies, Blackburn J's decision seems to rest on less secure foundations than he thought. Such statements as those in Cooper v. Stuart and Williams were either assertions of fact or they were dicta (see also Hocking, 1993) . Blackburn J's conclusion that the common law extinguished indigenous communal title was not disapproved by Brennan J in Maborather, Brennan J held that the Australian common law was entitled to develop in a different direction from that of English colonial law and that neither this line of precedent nor the racist logic underpinning it formed a part of the Australian common law. The racist logic, however: the conclusion that Australian aborigines and Torres Strait islanders were considered "uncivilised" and "primitive" by the English colonial law, is not wholly apparent from the cases that we have so far considered. Rather, the presence of the aborigines is either entirely ignored or it is baldly stated that their rights were abrogated upon settlement. The missing piece of the jigsaw -the case that forced the hand of the English courts to justify dispossession -is In re Southern Rhodesia.
IN RE SOUTHERN RHODESIA
The theory that the indigenous inhabitants of a "settled" colony had no proprietary interest in the land thus depended on a discriminatory denigration of indigenous inhabitants, their social organization and customs. As the basis of the theory is false in fact and unacceptable in our society, there is a choice of legal principle to be made in the present case. This Court can either apply the existing principles and proceed to inquire whether the Meriam people are higher "in the scale of social organization" than the Australian
Aborigines whose claims were "utterly disregarded" by the existing authorities or the Lord Sumner concluded that within the spectrum of indigenous social organization, the Ndebele and Shona "approximate rather to the lower than to the higher limit" and that there was no evidence that their societies permitted them "some shadow of the rights known to our law". Therefore, after the Ndebele king had been conquered by a BSAC force on behalf of the Crown, the Crown's title to the land was not impeded by any claim that could be made by the Ndebele or Shona. (It is perhaps important for the present discussion that the Privy Council characterised the Crown's entitlement to beneficial title in land in Southern Rhodesia as "residuary, for if these lands are not shown to belong to any private owner, the practical conclusion would seem to be that they are the Crown's"
-Southern Rhodesia per Lord Sumner at 231.)
In Southern Rhodesia, colonial rhetoric about respect for private property was put directly to the legal test before the highest British colonial court for perhaps the first time in the second empire. 8 The Ndebele and Shona were legally represented, albeit inadequately, in this action and the Judicial Committee couldn't escape the fact that they claimed the property rights to which English precedent said they were entitled (RobertsWray, 1966: 626 -7). Nor was it possible to say that they had abandoned their claim or ceded their rights to the Crown; or that the Crown had acted to extinguish their private property rights. Southern Rhodesia therefore represents a moment in which the colonial rhetoric of legal and moral legitimacy clashed directly with the raw mechanisms of power that were the more quotidian indigenous experience of colonisation. The Privy
Council's response to the challenge was to create a new rule: the private property rights of indigenous inhabitants would only be acknowledged by the courts if they pre-existed colonialism in a form recognisable to English common law. The court was forced to 15 reveal (and to endorse) the moral logic underpinning dispossession in a way that it had previously been able to avoid. (Hussain, 2003: the prospect of establishing that his or her society was one that was sufficiently "civilised" for its system of land tenure to be recognised at common law. It was plainly unacceptable to Brennan J that future claimants should be placed in such a position.
Accordingly, Brennan J cast the "discriminatory denigration of indigenous inhabitants, their social organization and customs" out of the Australian common law and into another time, another place:
16
The facts as we know them today do not fit the 'absence of law' or 'barbarian' theory underpinning the colonial reception of the common law of England. That being so, there is no warrant for applying in these times rules of the English common law which were the product of that theory. It would be a curious doctrine to propound today that, when the benefit of the common law was first extended to Her Majesty's indigenous subjects in the Antipodes, its first fruits were to strip them of their right to occupy their ancestral lands.
Yet the supposedly barbarian nature of indigenous people provided the common law of England with the justification for denying them their traditional rights and interests in land … (Mabo per Brennan J at 59.)
In place of the logic underpinning Southern Rhodesia, Brennan J sought to delineate a test that would respect the law and culture of indigenous Australians within a framework provided by the common law. This reflected Brennan J's concern to achieve present justice for indigenous Australians, while correspondingly securing the basic structure and principles of Australian common law. These concerns are better appreciated when we contrast Brennan J's approach with that of the sole Mabo dissentient, Dawson J. policy to do that, and that is a matter for government rather than the courts. In the meantime it would be wrong to attempt to revise history or to fail to recognize its legal impact, however unpalatable it may now seem. To do so would be to impugn the foundations of the very legal system under which this case must be decided. This is implicit within Dawson J's conclusion that while past injustices are regrettable, their effects are confined to the realms of history and politics and are outside the purview of the contemporary judicial system. By contrast, Brennan J's Mabo judgment connects the present inequalities between non-indigenous and indigenous Australians directly with the past injustices of the English common law, opening space to construct an Australian common law that seems to break with its former complicity with political racism.
In the more sombre atmosphere of 2007, with the conservative approach to history prevailing in Australian political discourse, it seems almost churlish to suggest that Brennan J failed to escape the traces of racism in his Mabo judgment. Nevertheless, and particularly in light of the slightly disappointing native title decisions of the last few years, 9 it feels timely to ask whether Mabo was as revolutionary as has often been 
A NEW AUSTRALIAN COMMON LAW?
Where a clan or group has continued to acknowledge the laws and (so far as practicable)
to observe the customs based on the traditions of that clan or group, whereby their traditional connexion with the land has been subsequently maintained, the traditional community title of that clan or group can be said to remain in existence. The common law can, by reference to the traditional laws and customs of an indigenous people, identify and protect the native rights and interests to which they give rise. However, when the tide of history has washed away any real acknowledgment of traditional law and any real observance of traditional customs, the foundation of native law has disappeared. (Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) 
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The starting point might be to recognise that the problem starts with us non-Aboriginal Australians.
It begins, I think, with the act of recognition. Recognition that it was we who did the dispossessing. We took the traditional lands and smashed the traditional way of life. We brought the disasters. The alcohol. We committed the murders. We took the children from their mothers. We practised discrimination and exclusion.
10
In the political climate of 1992, it seemed more than possible to move away from the racism that had marked the colonial past.
There were at least three important limitations on Brennan J's ability to break with the past in his Mabo judgment. First, the legitimacy of the transfer of sovereignty to the Crown was not a justiciable issue in Australian courts (Mabo per Brennan J. at 31; Russell, 2005:248) . Second, Brennan J concluded that he was constrained to ensure that his decision would not "fracture the skeleton of principle" on which the Australian legal system hung (at 29 -30) . Third, Brennan J concluded that the Crown could extinguish native title at any time provided that it evinced a clear and plain intention to do so (at 64, compare the decision of Deane and Gaudron JJ). While Mabo would therefore always represent a compromise (Russell, 2005: 248) between present-day colonial interests and present-day indigenous claims, Brennan J was determined to carve out a space within which indigenous communities could claim and be granted recognition for their prior claim to Australian land. The contours of that space were fundamentally determined by the limitations that Brennan J perceived, and these contours have been exhaustively mapped by Russell (2005) , Pearson (1993) and many others. I am less concerned with these outer limits of the recognition of native title, and more interested in the substance of the space within which it is possible to assert title.
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In Mabo, Brennan J set out a test for recognising native title. He expressed the test as one that depended more on the internal criteria of the society whose claim was at stake than it did on the external criteria of the common law: "Native title has its origin in and is given its content by the traditional laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the indigenous inhabitants of a territory." (At 58.) The internal test then was one of traditional laws and traditional customs, with the external gloss that indigenous claimants must demonstrate an uninterrupted connection between the traditional laws, the traditional customs and the land. This test was predicated on a particular vision of what is distinctive about indigenous Australian societies -a notion that what is "authentic" about these communities can only be that which existed in a precolonial time (Tuhiwai-Smith, 1999: 24) , perhaps with the odd "modern" accoutrement such as a motorised boat or refrigerator (Yanner v. Eaton [1999] HCA 53 per Gummow J at ¶68 -70). Requiring native title claimants to prove tradition required them to deal with the obstacles presented by the colonial past that was disowned by Brennan J and to fit themselves within an idea about aboriginality that is largely a non-aboriginal construct (Anderson, 1995) . While predominantly white "Australian" society can change and adapt itself to contemporary circumstances, an indigenous society that does the same risks being accused of "loss of culture, acculturation" (Frank, 2000:164) Notwithstanding Brennan J's reference to the internal criteria of traditional indigenous laws and customs, the "museum culture" (Frank, 2000) imported by Brennan J into the Australian common law arguably constitutes a modern, and more kindly-intended, version of the ratio decidendi in Southern Rhodesia: the private property rights of indigenous inhabitants will only be acknowledged by the courts if they pre-existed colonialism in a form recognisable to [Australian] common law. This is not the same as saying that Mabo didn't change anything: it did offer indigenous Australians at least the hope of greater recognition of their place in Australian history, and it provided a more honest account of the relationship between Australian colonisation and indigenous dispossession. But in the final analysis, despite Brennan J's best intentions, Mabo did not displace racism and empire-building to another time and place. The common law of Australia, built as it is on the ultimate fact that sovereignty was wrested from indigenous Australians, retained the right to decide when and where race and empire comes into play. Native title is a white Australian construction: its necessity comes from the fact of colonialism; the questions of who is indigenous, when a law or custom is traditional, how a law or custom might be expressed are all ultimately constrained by the force at the heart of Australian law (Derrida, 1992) . It is not possible fully to do justice to indigenous Australians through an Australian common law that owes so much to its colonial pastbut nor is it justly possible to refuse to try. In a different time and place, Brennan J deserves recognition for having done at least that much. Much more remains to be done. identified that the pre-existing common law (other than Southern Rhodesia) did not compel a particular outcome. Brennan J was entirely forthright that he was extending the common law to cover a dispute that had not previously arisen in the same form in the jurisdiction. According to positivist legal theory, this is a necessary function of common law judges: "if courts are empowered to make authoritative determinations of the fact that a rule has been broken, these cannot avoid being taken as authoritative determinations of what the rules are. So the rule which confers jurisdiction will also be a rule of recognition, identifying the primary rules through the judgments of the courts and these judgments will become a 'source' of law." (Hart 1994 at 96, see also 273 -4.) 5 I use the words "could not be pressed" rather than "were not pressed" to make the point that, in the cases I am discussing (from Attorney-General v. Brown to Williams v. Attorney-General), the traditional indigenous owners of the relevant land were not parties to the case and had no legal representation. Furthermore, because of pervasive discrimination against Aborigines in relation to citizenship, education, living standards, access to the professions and the right to select land, the traditional owners had neither the means nor the opportunity to press their claims to land.
See Wolfe (1994) for a combination of historical reasons, the first occasion on which an Aboriginal plaintiff brought a "native title" case before an Australian court and the first time that an Australian or English court was required to rule directly, as opposed to obliquely, on the question of whether native title survived the transfer of sovereignty over Australian territory to the Crown.
